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I. INTRODUCTION 
Elenilson J. Ortiz-Franco is one of eleven million immigrants living in 
the United States without permission from the U.S. government.
1
  Ortiz-
Franco, a citizen of El Salvador, is a former member of the Salvadoran 
gang MS-13; he immigrated to the United States in 1987, joined MS-13, 
and eventually became an informant for federal prosecutors in New York.
2
  
Ortiz-Franco fears torture at the hands of members of the MS-13 gang 
should he be forced to return to his country of citizenship.
3
 
Following his entry into the United States, Ortiz-Franco was convicted 
of criminal possession of a weapon, attempted petit larceny, and possession 
of a controlled substance.
4
  Ortiz-Franco was indicted on federal charges 
relating to gang activity and attended a proffer session with the 
government, in which he exchanged information about criminal activity for 
                                                          
 1.  See Jens Manuel Korgstand & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts About Illegal 
Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-
the-u-s/ (citing the large portion of the immigrant population that is undocumented to 
show the importance of the legal issues these immigrants face); see also Ortiz-Franco 
v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting petitioner’s illegal entry into the 
U.S.). 
 2.  See Ortiz-Franco, 782 F.3d at 83-84 (describing Ortiz-Franco’s past, prior to 
arriving in the United States, and his involvement with MS-13 and the U.S. 
government). 
 3.   See id. at 85 (referencing Ortiz-Franco’s fear that if returned to El Salvador, 
the gang members will kill him, and the Salvadoran government will not be willing or 
able to stop the gang violence). 
 4.  See id. at 83-84 (identifying three criminal convictions that Ortiz-Franco 
accrued from 1992 to 1996). 
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leniency on the part of the prosecution.
5
  He believes his cooperation with 
federal prosecutors will be perceived by the gang as a betrayal causing 
leading members of MS-13 in El Salvador to retaliate and kill him upon his 
return to the country.
6
  Accordingly, Ortiz-Franco applied for deferral of 
his removal under the protections granted by the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT).
7
  The immigration judge denied Ortiz-Franco’s application 
for deferral of removal under the CAT.
8
  On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Ortiz-
Franco’s denial.
9
  The Court determined its lack of jurisdiction stemmed 
from a statutory bar that restricts jurisdiction to only “constitutional claims 




This Comment will address the recent circuit split over the correct 
interpretation and application of the jurisdictional bar preventing appellate 
review of factual questions in review of denials of CAT deferral.
11
  First, 
Part II briefly introduces CAT deferral and the statutes controlling the 
jurisdiction of courts to review denials of CAT deferral.
12
  Second, Part III 
will address the courts’ interpretations of the jurisdictional bar to appellate 
review of factual questions in denials of CAT deferral.
13
  Finally, Part III 
will also argue that the jurisdictional bar is not applicable to intrinsically 
mixed issues of law and fact.
14
 
                                                          
 5.  See id. at 84 (noting Ortiz-Franco was indicted along with fellow members of 
MS-13 on charges relating to a fight with a rival gang, in which Ortiz-Franco and 
others made gestures associating them with MS-13). 
 6.  See id. (stating Ortiz-Franco’s co-defendants received copies of his proffer 
statements, ultimately making the gang aware of his cooperation with the government). 
 7.  See id. (noting Ortiz-Franco’s application for deferral of removal under the 
CAT rather than withholding of removal, which he would have been barred from 
receiving due to his criminal convictions). 
 8.  See id. at 85 (identifying denial of Ortiz-Franco’s application because the 
immigration judge did not find sufficient evidence to prove Ortiz-Franco would be 
more likely than not to be tortured if returned to El Salvador). 
 9.   See id. at 91 (finding lack of jurisdiction to review factual issues raised by 
Ortiz-Franco on appeal). 
 10.  See id. at 88 (holding Ortiz-Franco fell within the scope of the jurisdictional 
bar due to his prior criminal convictions). 
 11.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2005) (limiting the jurisdiction of appellate 
courts to review denials of various forms of immigration relief); see also infra Part III. 
 12.  See infra Part II.A-D (explaining the concepts of defensive immigration relief, 
such as CAT deferral, and appellate review of such decisions). 
 13.  See infra Part III.A-B (addressing the two main interpretations of 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C) that create a circuit split). 
 14.  See infra Part III.C-VI (concluding jurisdictional bar does not apply to CAT 
deferral review due to the mixed nature of the questions on appeal). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Relief Under the Convention Against Torture and Bars to Relief 
After an immigrant is found to be removable, three primary defensive 
applications exist to help the immigrant avoid removal if he or she exhibits 
a credible fear of returning to his or her home country.
15
  Deferral under the 
CAT became a part of U.S. immigration law in 1998 when Congress 
enacted the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA).
16
  
Removal of an individual to a country where he or she would be more 
likely than not to be tortured is a violation of the CAT, and deferral 
prevents the removal of an individual, who otherwise is barred from relief, 
to a country where he or she would likely be tortured.
17
 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) developed regulations in 1999 to 
comply with certain requirements in FARRA, including the requirement 
that relief under the CAT must be excluded from individuals barred from 
asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA).
18
  To comply with the requirements, the DOJ created a method 




The major difference between the previous forms of relief, such as 
withholding of removal, and CAT deferral of removal is that the latter is 
available to applicants regardless of their inadmissibility for prior criminal 
activity.
20
  A criminal conviction is not an automatic bar to relief in the 
                                                          
 15.  See Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1142-
43 (2015) (describing three types of fear-based relief from removal, which are asylum, 
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and deferral 
of removal under the CAT). 
 16.  See id. at 1144 (explaining the background of the adoption of CAT by 
Congress); see also Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, H.R. 1757, 
105th Cong. (1998) (incorporating portions of the CAT into U.S. law). 
 17.  See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 
8478-01, 8479 (Feb. 19, 1999). 
 18.  See Heeren, supra note 15, at 1144 (stating that DOJ needs to limit availability 
of CAT relief and explaining the nature of the regulations that Congress required when 
it incorporated the CAT as part of federal law). 
 19.  See id. (differentiating the two kinds of relief the DOJ created to comply with 
congressionally mandated exclusionary requirements).   
 20.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a) (2012) (allowing a grant of deferral of removal to 
individuals who are subject to “mandatory denial of withholding of removal under §§ 
208.16(d)(2) or (d)(3)”); see also id. § 208.16(d)(2)-(3) (mandating denial of 
withholding of removal for individuals who were convicted of a “particularly serious 
crime” or “an aggravated felony (or felonies)” and the immigration judge does not 
determine, on an individual basis, that the crime (or crimes) was not a “particularly 
serious crime”). 
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form of deferral of removal.
21
  An individual who meets the required 
elements for deferral of removal will not be removed to a country where 
the court finds the individual is more likely than not to be tortured.
22
  
Deferrals of removal under the CAT lack finality, and the orders function 
more as injunctions that prevent the enforcement of the preexisting final 
order of removal, which is a requirement to receive relief in the form of 
deferral under the CAT.
23
  The grant of deferral of removal does not 




To determine whether an individual is entitled to protection under the 
CAT, the immigration judge (IJ) considers evidence of past torture and 
whether the applicant can relocate within the country to a place where he or 
she would not likely be tortured.
25
  Initially, the IJ must determine whether 




The INA bars review of final orders of removal against an individual 
who has committed a crime enumerated in various sections of the Act.
27
  
The Act includes a provision for judicial review of “constitutional claims or 
questions of law.”
28
  The bar to review due to criminal activity does not 
limit this jurisdictional grant.
29
  The Code of Federal Regulations defines 
                                                          
 21.  See id. § 208.16(d)(2)-(3) (differing from withholding because individuals who 
were convicted of a “particularly serious crime” or “an aggravated felony (or felonies)” 
are not automatically excluded from eligibility for relief). 
 22.  See id. § 208.17(a) (defining elements for eligibility for deferral, which lacks a 
discretionary element). 
 23.  See Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 264 (7th Cir. 2013) (differentiating 
between final orders of removal and deferrals of removal under the CAT on the basis of 
the respective function and finality of each). 
 24.  See id. (discussing the ability to revisit the circumstances of cases and remove 
the injunction preventing the execution of the final order of removal). 
 25.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)-(iv) (2012) (listing additional evidence the IJ 
considers, including: evidence of “gross, flagrant or mass violation of human rights 
within the country of removal” and other information about country conditions).   
 26.  See id. § 208.16(c)(4) (noting the order in which the IJ should approach CAT 
relief applications). 
 27.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2005) (stripping appellate courts of jurisdiction 
to review final orders of removal when the individual to be removed has committed any 
offense in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), 
or (D)). 
 28.  See id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (limiting review to exclude questions of fact).   
 29.  See id. (defining orders of removal as “final” when (1) the respondent waives 
her right to appeal, (2) the time allowed for an appeal expires without the respondent 
filing an appeal, (3) a subsequent decision ordering removal is issued if the original 
was certified to the BIA or Attorney General, (4) an IJ orders an individual removed in 
5
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an order of removal as “final” when the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) dismisses the appeal.
30
 
Jurisdiction to review certain types of claims is granted or limited by 
provisions in the INA.
31
  The changes made to the INA through the REAL 
ID Act of 2005 came about in part due to the decision in INS v. St. Cyr.
32
  
In that decision, the Supreme Court held that previous versions of the INA 
did not eliminate habeas corpus review by district courts because the 
provisions in the statute did not strip jurisdiction through a “clear, 
unambiguous, and express” declaration.
33
 
B. Mixed Issues of Law and Fact 
The jurisdiction of appellate courts to review many immigration 
decisions is generally limited to only issues of law or constitutional claims 
and not questions of fact.
34
  Even where the decisions by lower courts and 
administrative judges are heavily criticized, appellate courts generally must 
defer to the lower court’s factual findings.
35
  Claims for relief under Article 




The distinction between law and fact for the purposes of assigning 
responsibility for decision-making exists in the Constitution and has been 
                                                          
absentia, or (5) an individual overstays an order of removal connected to a grant of 
voluntary departure).   
 30.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a)-(f) (2008) (listing additional instances when an order 
of removal becomes final, including when the respondent waives appeal, when the time 
period to appeal ends, upon entry of an order of removal made during the respondent’s 
absence, etc.). 
 31.  See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 310-11 (2005) 
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to include § 1252(a)(4)–(5), creating a separate provision 
for CAT claims and a provision of exclusive means of review). 
 32.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Franco-Ortiz v. Lynch, 2015 WL 5607691 
(No. 15-362), at 18 (identifying the decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 
(2001) as a major factor in the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005). 
 33.  See id. (referencing the holding in St. Cyr, which spurred on the passage of the 
REAL ID Act to clarify the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA). 
 34.  See Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formula for Judicial Review: The Law-
Fact Distinction in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 57 
(2010) (discussing the law-fact distinction as a threshold determination to either allow 
or preclude judicial review in removal proceedings). 
 35.  See id. at 57-58 (criticizing the requirement that appellate courts defer to IJs’ 
decisions as to factual findings in nearly all cases); see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., 
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 351-52 
(Nov. 2007) (noting the increase in summary affirmances in CAT claims). 
 36.  See Sharpless, supra note 34, at 58 (identifying the importance of the 
resolution of factual issues in claims for relief under the CAT). 
6
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss1/4
VOGT 10/5/2016 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2017  8:09 AM 
2017] AS A MATTER OF FACT, NO 93 
extended into legal history through incorporation in various laws over 
time.
37
  Historically, questions of law involve applicable standards and 
rules, while issues of fact concern the events or occurrences that gave rise 
to the legal action.
38
  The distinction between issues of law and issues of 
fact is not as clear as it might seem, especially in assessing jurisdiction for 
appellate review.
39
  The Ninth Circuit in Estrada-Corona v. Holder 
identified and discussed the distinction between pure issues of law or fact 
and mixed questions of law and fact, further noting whether an individual is 
more likely than not to be tortured if removed to a certain country is a 
mixed question of law and fact.
40
 
Appellate review doctrine institutionalizes the systemic issues inherent 
that are in the law-fact distinction.
41
  Typically, appellate courts review 
lower court factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard, which is 
very deferential to lower courts.
42
  Appellate courts review lower courts’ 
legal determinations de novo.
43
  There is no clear standard, however, for 
instances of mixed questions of law and fact, questions that turn on the 
application of certain legal standards to facts.
44
 
Courts are divided on the question of whether an individual is 
substantially likely to be tortured is a question of law or fact.
45
  The 
                                                          
 37.  See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1769, 1778 (2003) (citing  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. 
CONST. amend. VII). 
 38.  See id. at 1778 (distinguishing between issues of law and fact).   
 39.  See id. at 1778-79, 1784 (noting that traditionally, legal questions involve 
standards and rules, while factual questions center on events and transactions, but the 
distinction has become muddled). 
 40.  See Estrada-Corona v. Holder, 554 F. App’x. 579, 579  (9th Cir. 2014) (mem.) 
(holding that a finding regarding the likelihood an individual will be tortured with 
acquiescence of government officials, if removed, is a mixed question of law and fact); 
accord Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (defining mixed 
questions of law and fact as the application of a legal standard to undisputed facts); 
Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (differentiating between 
mixed and pure questions of law or fact). 
 41.  See Allen, supra note 37, at 1784-85 (identifying the importance of the law-
fact distinction in appellate review doctrine). 
 42.  See id. (outlining the standards of review applied by appellate courts to each 
type of question). 
 43.  See id. at 1785 (noting appellate courts apply the least deferential standard to 
questions of law). 
 44.  See id. at 1778-79 (identifying that using mixed questions of law and fact to 
determine what standard of review to apply is highly complicated and confusing). 
 45.  See Sharpless, supra note 34, at 70 (arguing that courts disagree about whether 
legal standards applied to determine the “likelihood of something happening” fall under 
the law or fact distinction). 
7
Vogt: As a Matter of Fact, No
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017
VOGT 10/5/2016 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2017  8:09 AM 
94 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 25:1 
question of whether certain actions rise to the level of torture as defined by 
the CAT is typically treated as a question of law.
46
  Courts are divided over 
the law-fact status of legal standards regarding the likelihood of something 
happening or not happening.
47
 
The disagreement among courts about whether specific issues are legal 
or factual questions is particularly complicated regarding the questions of 
reviewability.
48
  For example, the threshold question for review of denials 
of deferral of removal explicitly requires a determination of whether 
established facts are sufficient to satisfy a rule.
49
  Courts typically view this 




C. Appellate Courts and the Jurisdictional Bar 
The Second Circuit held in Ortiz-Franco v. Holder that it did not have 
jurisdiction to review the IJ’s denial of Ortiz-Franco’s application for 
deferral of removal.
51
  The court noted that it was rare that it directly 
addressed the jurisdictional issue that it had attempted to avoid answering 
in the past.
52
  In his petition for writ of certiorari, Ortiz-Franco challenged 
the court’s determination that its jurisdiction was limited when reviewing a 
final order of removal.
53
 
The jurisdictional statute at issue in Ortiz-Franco’s appeal and 
subsequent petition for certiorari, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), does not define 
                                                          
 46.  See id. at 70-71 (noting the Second and Third Circuits have treated likelihood 
of torture as a purely legal question, while other circuits have treated the same issue as 
purely factual). 
 47.  See id. at 70 (stating that courts disagree about what kind of question 
determinations of likelihood are). 
 48.  See id. (finding courts tend to view whether the likelihood of torture is 
reviewable as purely a question of law because it is a mixed question). 
 49.  See id. (identifying the threshold question for review of denials of relief under 
Article 3 of CAT that is whether the established facts satisfy the rule that the applicant 
is substantially likely to be tortured). 
 50.  See id. (noting the treatment of a mixed question as a purely legal question). 
 51.  See Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding a bar to 
the appellate jurisdiction in Ortiz-Franco’s case due to prior criminal convictions). 
 52.  See id. (finding a general policy of avoidance of the jurisdictional question 
wherever possible, in favor of assuming hypothetical jurisdiction). 
 53.  See id. at 88 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) as limiting jurisdiction to review 
a final order of removal in this and similar cases).  But see Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 32 (arguing that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the 
jurisdictional statute because it is not clear that CAT claims are final orders under 
FARRA § 2242(d)). 
8
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final order of removal.
54
  Looking to FARRA § 2242(d), it is not clear that 
denials of CAT deferral are actually final orders of removal, calling into 
question the applicability of the bar to CAT decisions.
55
  The statute grants 
jurisdiction to review orders of removal, as long as it is not an order of 
removal without a hearing, but denials of deferral are not mentioned in the 
statute.
56
  Further, the statute provides that review under this section of the 
INA is the “sole and exclusive means for judicial review” of any claim 
under the CAT.
57
  The grant of jurisdiction to review CAT decisions is 
separate from the grant of jurisdiction earlier in the statute for review of 
final orders of removal.
58
 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue of the jurisdictional bar in 
Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, in which an IJ denied Lemus-Galvan deferral 
under the CAT based on a determination that it was not more likely than 
not that he would be tortured if returned to Mexico.
59
  The court held on 
appeal that it had jurisdiction to review the claim for deferral under the 




Additionally, the Seventh Circuit discussed the jurisdictional bar in 
Wanjiru v. Holder, which involved a denial of deferral under the CAT due 
to a conviction for misdemeanor sexual misconduct, which Wanjiru 
conceded was a crime of moral turpitude.
61
  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the 
appellate court in this case found it had jurisdiction to review the claim 
because the denial did not constitute a final order of removal for the 
                                                          
 54.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2005) (lacking a definition of final order of 
removal, creating confusion over whether a denial of deferral under the CAT is a final 
order of removal subject to jurisdictional limits in the statute). 
 55.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 17 (noting the lack of 
definition of CAT deferral decisions as final orders of removal, raising the question of 
whether the jurisdictional bar should apply to CAT deferral decisions). 
 56.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). 
 57.  See id. § 1252(a)(4). 
 58.  See id. (separating final orders of removal and CAT decisions, leading to a 
potential interpretation that they are different types of claims and not subject to the 
same limits on reviewability). 
 59.  See Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the decision below, as well as Lemus-Galvan’s underlying conviction for 
attempted second degree murder). 
 60.  See id. at 1083-84 (distinguishing between denials of withholding and deferral 
under the CAT, and noting that denials of deferral based on determinations of the 
likelihood of torture are necessarily decisions on the merits that are reviewable). 
 61.  See Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 262-63 (7th Cir. 2013) (questioning 
whether a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude strips the court of 
jurisdiction to review the denial of deferral under the CAT). 
9
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A. Statutory Construction Does Not Support Application of the 
Jurisdictional Bar to CAT Claims 
The separation of CAT decisions and final orders of removal for the 
purposes of the jurisdictional statute is significant.  By separating the 
portion of the statute granting jurisdiction over review of final orders of 
removal from a distinct portion of the statute discussing review of CAT 
decisions, the statute distinguishes between the two.
63
  The separation of 
final orders of removal and CAT decisions for the purposes of 
reviewability suggests that the two should be treated differently.
64
 
Within the statute, CAT claims are separated from final orders of 
removal outside of the jurisdictional bar.
65
  A portion of the statute 
eliminates habeas corpus review for final orders of removal.
66
  The section 
immediately preceding that section of the statute eliminates habeas corpus 
review for CAT claims.
67
  If decisions on CAT claims were final orders of 
removal, there would be no need to have two separate sections within the 
same statute eliminating the same type of collateral review for each.
68
  
Alternatively, if CAT claims are not distinct from final orders of removal, 
the statutory provision divesting appellate courts of habeas review in cases 
of CAT claims would be unnecessary, as it would already have been 
                                                          
 62.  See id. at 264-65 (focusing on the Supreme Court’s warning that statutory 
interpretations preserving judicial review are favored, and noting the importance of 
keeping open the means of judicial review that make sure the U.S. complies with its 
obligations under the CAT). 
 63.  See id. (granting jurisdiction over CAT decisions); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(A) (2005) (granting jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, aside 
from orders granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)). 
 64.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32 (noting statutory distinctions 
between final orders of removal and CAT decisions suggest disparate treatment of the 
two). 
 65.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)-(5) (2005) (creating a distinction between orders of 
removal and CAT claims). 
 66.  See id. (eliminating habeas corpus review explicitly for an order of removal 
only).   
 67.  See id. § 1252(a)(4) (eliminating habeas corpus review for CAT claims only, 
thereby drawing a distinction between orders of removal and CAT claims). 
 68.  See id. (distinguishing between CAT claims and final orders of removal for the 
purpose of eliminating habeas corpus review); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 32, at 19 (noting statutory distinctions between final orders of removal and 
CAT decisions for the purpose of habeas review as suggesting the two concepts are not 
the same). 
10
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covered under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
69
 
1. The Legislative History of the REAL ID Act of 2005 Further Supports 
Inapplicability of the Bar to CAT Claims 
The argument in favor of the inapplicability of the jurisdictional bar to 
CAT claims is supported not only by the distinctions within the statute 
between final orders and CAT claims but also by the legislative history of 
the REAL ID Act.
70
  Because the INS v. St. Cyr decision was one of the 
major reasons the REAL ID Act was enacted, it is clear that the purpose of 
amending the INA was to clarify the meaning of jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions.
71
  If the purpose of the amendments to the INA were to clarify 
when appellate courts are stripped of jurisdiction to review claims in 
response to the St. Cyr decision, it would sensibly follow that the 
amendments themselves were meant to be explicit and clear.
72
  Thus, the 
amendments should be read as expressing the intended jurisdictional bars 
and limitations.
73
  If Congress wanted to create a jurisdictional bar that 
applied to review of denials of CAT deferral, based on the purpose of the 
amendments, it is likely that Congress would have unambiguously stripped 
appellate courts of jurisdiction to review those claims.
74
  Additionally, it is 
clear that CAT claims are treated differently than final orders across the 
entirety of the statute, which further bolsters the argument that the 
jurisdictional bar was not intended to apply to CAT claims.
75
  When taken 
together with the legislative history, it appears that Congress did not intend 
for the jurisdictional bar to apply to CAT claims because if it did want the 
bar to apply, it would have spoken clearly.
76
 
                                                          
 69.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 19 (differentiating 
between final orders and CAT decisions as two distinct concepts). 
 70.  See id. at 18 (identifying the requirement in INS v. St. Cyr that Congress speak 
clearly and unambiguously when repealing habeas jurisdiction or stripping other 
jurisdiction as the major cause of the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005). 
 71.  See id. (describing the purpose of the amendments to expressly eliminate 
habeas review under the INA in response to the St. Cyr decision). 
 72.  See id. at 18-19 (identifying the provisions of the INA that were amended to 
more clearly strip appellate courts of jurisdiction to review specific claims). 
 73.  See id. at 19 (focusing on the purpose of clarifying jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions and the explicit separation of orders of removal and CAT claims within the 
amendments). 
 74.  See id. at 18 (emphasizing the purpose of the amendments to clarify 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions). 
 75.  See id. at 20 (noting the holistic approach to statutory interpretation and the 
disparate treatment of CAT claims and final orders across the statute). 
 76.  See id. at 18, 20 (identifying the need for Congress to explicitly restrict 
jurisdiction where it meant to do so). 
11
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The Second Circuit’s argument that the statutory provisions of the INA 
are explicit and serve to clarify one another is not convincing because the 
argument suggests the statute is either redundant or that CAT claims 
actually are distinct from final orders.
77
  In considering the clarifying 
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), the court essentially noted that there was 
no substantial difference between that provision and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(5).
78
  The court faced a complicated position and had to argue in 
favor of a redundant interpretation to avoid acknowledging that the more 




2. Wanjiru v. Holder Advances the Appropriate Treatment of Denials of 
Deferral Under the CAT Due to a Lack of Finality in These Decisions, as 
Distinguished from Final Orders of Removal 
The lack of finality in deferrals of removal under the CAT comes from 
the function of the orders as an injunction that prevents the enforcement of 
a preexisting final order of removal, which is a requirement to receive relief 
in the form of deferral under the CAT.
80
  This distinction between the 
finality of the two orders is supported by the statutory construction, as well 
as the function of each order.
81
  The Seventh Circuit extended this 
reasoning behind inapplicability of the statutory bar in Wanjiru v. Holder, 
noting the temporary nature of deferral of removal under the CAT.
82
  Ortiz-
Franco’s case is distinct from Wanjiru’s because there is no question that 
Ortiz-Franco has committed the requisite crimes to trigger the jurisdictional 
                                                          
 77.  See Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 88-89 (2d. Cir. 2015) (finding that § 
1252(a)(4) serves to clarify rather than being a redundancy); see also Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 32 (identifying the contradiction in the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the tension between § 1252(a)(4) and § 1252(a)(5), that either they are 
redundant or address two different types of claims). 
 78.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 21 (finding Second 
Circuit’s argument to mean that the court viewed the provision as merely explanatory 
and adding nothing to the overall statute).   
 79.  See id. (noting the Second Circuit’s discussion of the tension between the two 
provisions was brief). 
 80.  See Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 264 (7th Cir. 2013) (differentiating 
between final orders of removal and deferrals of removal under the CAT based on the 
function and finality of each). 
 81.  See id. (stating that deferrals are subject to changes in policy and discretion, 
unlike final orders of removal); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2005) (eliminating 
habeas corpus review for CAT claims only, thereby differentiating between an order of 
removal and CAT claims, which creates a tension between the two regarding whether 
the two categories are distinct). 
 82.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (noting the distinction in permanence between 
withholding and deferral of removal). 
12
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bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C).
83
  Due to this distinction, the analysis of Ortiz-
Franco’s claim should most closely resemble the alternative holding in 
Wanjiru v. Holder.
84
  The line the Seventh Circuit drew in Wanjiru most 
supports Ortiz-Franco’s claim to judicial review of his entire claim: denials 
of CAT deferrals are final enough to warrant judicial review, but they are 
not final orders that trigger the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar.
85
  Applying the 
approach of the Seventh Circuit to the facts of Ortiz-Franco’s claim, the 
IJ’s determination regarding the likelihood Ortiz-Franco would be tortured 
should he return to El Salvador would be reviewable on appeal because the 
denial of CAT deferral is not a final order of removal.
86
 
The appropriate approach to judicial review of denials of deferral under 
the CAT is to handle them in the same manner as injunctive relief, rather 
than as final orders.
87
  A grant of deferral of removal under the CAT is a 
temporary form of relief from removal, as it is not an order that is safe from 
change due to a shift in policy or circumstances, making it unlike a final 
order of removal.
88
  A denial of deferral under the CAT is not a final order 
either; rather, it is a decision regarding a form of relief from the execution 
of a final order of removal that was previously issued in an individual’s 
case.
89
  Likewise, a grant of deferral functions like a temporary injunction 
preventing the removal of an individual who is subject to a final order of 
removal.
90
  The deferral does not remove the preexisting final order of 
removal completely, only temporarily enjoining the execution of the 
                                                          
 83.  Compare id. at 263 (finding Wanjiru was not convicted of triggering crimes), 
with Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 83, 87 (2nd Cir. 2015) (noting crimes for 
which Ortiz-Franco was convicted, as well as the triggering of the jurisdictional bar by 
those convictions). 
 84.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (holding that the jurisdictional bar did not apply 
because denials of deferral under the CAT are not final orders).   
 85.  See id. (stating that a deferral of removal is more similar to an injunction rather 
than a final order).  
 86.  See id. (applying the jurisdictional bar only to final orders, not to decisions 
regarding deferrals); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 23-24 
(noting the decisions regarding deferrals made distinct from the undisturbed final order 
of removal made prior to the deferral decision). 
 87.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (distinguishing between the finality of final 
orders of removal and that of deferral under the CAT, which functions more like 
injunctive relief). 
 88.  See id. (addressing the ways deferral of removal mirrors an injunction, 
including the lack of certainty and finality, as well as the ability to revisit the claim). 
 89.  See id. (distinguishing CAT deferral from final orders); see also Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 13 (noting application of CAT deferral as an 
injunction preventing the execution of an intact final order). 
 90.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (highlighting the temporary nature of deferral of 
removal and the relative ease with which the protection from removal can be lifted). 
13
Vogt: As a Matter of Fact, No
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017
VOGT 10/5/2016 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2017  8:09 AM 
100 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 25:1 
order.
91
  Thus, the order of removal that was issued against the applicant 
prior to the application for relief under the CAT is not affected by the 
decision regarding that relief.
92
  The CAT decision is, therefore, not a final 
order of removal necessary to trigger the jurisdictional bar; rather, it is a 
barrier to execution of the order of removal in the case of the specific 
applicant.
93
  It is clear that the final order is not altered because if 
circumstances change that would make torture less likely in the case of the 
applicant, the government can end the deferral of removal under the CAT 
or remove the applicant to a third country.
94
  The distinction between the 
finality of the order of removal, which is always enforceable but for CAT 
relief, and a deferral under the CAT, which can change at any time due to a 
variety of circumstances, highlights the clear lack of finality in CAT relief 
decisions.
95
  Due to the lack of finality of the denials of deferral under the 
CAT, the jurisdictional bar should not apply to these decisions.
96
 
In his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ortiz-Franco made an alternative 
argument regarding statutory construction that is also compelling.
97
  
Section 1252(a)(4), granting jurisdiction to review any cause or claim for 
relief under CAT, is not subject to any other provision of the statute, which 
means the statute allows for review of denials of deferrals under the CAT 
notwithstanding a determination of finality.
98
  Further, the wording of § 
                                                          
 91.  See id. (discussing the ability to revisit the circumstances of cases and remove 
the injunction preventing the execution of the final order of removal). 
 92.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 23 (stating the nature of 
the CAT relief decision as analogous to an injunction that does not disturb an existing 
final order) (citing Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 263-65). 
 93.  See id. at 23 (arguing that a grant of deferral under the CAT merely prevents 
the government from executing the existing final order of removal rather than altering 
that order in any way). 
 94.  See id. (noting that changes in conditions alter the existence of CAT relief such 
that it allows or does not allow enforcement of the order of removal, rather than 
altering the existence of the order itself). 
 95.  See id. at 23-24 (stating appellate jurisdiction to review CAT claims is not 
barred by § 1252(a)(2)(C) because the decisions are not final in the same way an order 
of removal is, as evidenced by the way a deferral under CAT functions compared to the 
final order of removal). 
 96.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (identifying the lack of finality as precluding the 
application of the bar to review of CAT denials); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a)-(f) 
(2008) (listing the instances when an order of removal is “final,” not including a denial 
of relief under the CAT). 
 97.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 22 (arguing that the bar 
would not apply even if the deferral claims are final because § 1252(a)(4) still allows 
for review of factual claims). 
 98.  See id.(considering the jurisdictional bar inapplicable to review of CAT claims 
due to the intentional wording of the statute to override the criminal bar by including 
14
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss1/4
VOGT 10/5/2016 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2017  8:09 AM 
2017] AS A MATTER OF FACT, NO 101 
1252(a)(4) supports the finding that any question regarding a CAT claim is 
reviewable, thus including both legal and factual questions.
99
 
B. The Lemus-Galvan Reasoning as an Alternate Reason as  to Why the 
Jurisdictional Bar Does Not Apply 
Even if the argument that denials of deferral under the CAT are not 
sufficiently final to preclude jurisdiction because they function as a 
temporary injunction fails, there is a strong argument in favor of 
jurisdiction based on the nature of the decision underlying the denial.
100
  
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that denials of CAT deferral must be made 
on the merits of an individual’s claim provides alternate reasoning 
supporting the inapplicability of the jurisdictional bar to review of these 
denials.
101
  The focus on the nature of the decision as being made on the 
merits is critical for Ortiz-Franco’s claim that his denial of deferral should 
be reviewable regardless of the jurisdictional bar.
102
 
If Ortiz-Franco’s denial was based on his criminal conviction, a court 
following the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning would likely be barred from 
reviewing the determination.
103
  Such a denial would be more likely to 
occur in a claim for withholding of removal, where the statute clearly 
precludes relief in the form of withholding for individuals convicted of 
enumerated offenses.
104
  Review of a discretionary finding in a CAT 
                                                          
the portion stating notwithstanding any other provision of law so close to the 
jurisdictional bar within the statute). 
 99.  See id. (citing Lovan v. Holder, 574 F.3d 990, 998 (8th Cir. 2009)) (noting the 
language any cause or claim as broad and non-restrictive, thereby likely not intending 
to limit the jurisdiction to review CAT claims to any one type of question, allowing 
review of both questions of law and questions of fact). 
 100.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (holding in favor of jurisdiction based on the 
function of deferrals of removal as injunctions preventing the enforcement of 
preexisting final orders of removal); see also Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 
1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting jurisdiction to review denials of deferral based on 
the decision necessarily being made on the merits). 
 101.  See Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1083 (asserting that the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar 
does not apply to denials of CAT deferral because they are necessarily made on the 
merits due to the nature of the claims). 
 102.  See id. at 1084 (noting the significance of the fact that the denial of the deferral 
claim was not based on the criminal conviction, rather due to an IJ’s finding on the 
possibility of internal relocation). 
 103.  See id. (distinguishing between determinations based on a criminal conviction 
and those made on the merits, noting those based on criminal convictions would be 
subject to the jurisdictional bar). 
 104.  See id. at 1083 (referencing the clear bar to review under § 1252(a)(2)(C) in 
cases of denials of withholding of removal when the individual has been convicted of 
certain crimes). 
15
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withholding claim is precluded by case law, preventing review of denials 
based strictly on the criminal conviction.
105
  By the same reasoning, denials 
based on a combination of facts and law are reviewable.
106
  Under the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, Ortiz-Franco’s denial should be reviewable if his 
claim was denied due to a determination made on the merits of his claim.
107
 
The IJ in Ortiz-Franco denied the application for deferral under the CAT 
because he found that Ortiz-Franco did not provide sufficient evidence that 
it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he was returned to 
El Salvador, meaning the determination was on the merits of Ortiz-
Franco’s claim.
108
  Based on the nature of the IJ’s decision, the issue of 
whether Ortiz-Franco provided sufficient evidence of the likelihood he 
would be tortured should be reviewable on appeal.
109
  As the denial was not 
based on Ortiz-Franco’s underlying criminal convictions, the decision was 
based on the merits of Ortiz-Franco’s claim and thus, under the Ninth 




C. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact Are Outside the Scope of the 
Jurisdictional Bar 
The decisions of the appellate courts all but disregard a critical flaw in 
the statutory structure of the jurisdictional bar; it separates reviewable 
                                                          
 105.  See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing the 
distinction between denials based on criminal convictions and those the government 
argues fall under the jurisdictional bar, which are mixed issues of law and fact, rather 
than strictly discretionary determinations). 
 106.  See id. (noting that mixed questions of law and fact are not strictly 
discretionary determinations). 
 107.  See Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (noting when a denial of deferral is based 
on some merit determination other than an individual’s criminal convictions, the 
appellate court should have jurisdiction to review the denial, as it is not explicitly 
barred by the statute). 
 108.  See Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 83 (2nd Cir. 2015) (citing the holding 
below that Ortiz-Franco failed to prove this element that is required for CAT relief to 
be granted). 
 109.  See id. at 85, 91 (noting the IJ’s basis for his decision to deny Ortiz-Franco’s 
application and that the issue was not reviewable); see also Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 
1084 (citing Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007)) (stating that review of 
decisions on the merits is not precluded under the jurisdictional bar). 
 110.  See Ortiz-Franco, 782 F.3d at 91 (identifying the basis for the denial below as 
Ortiz-Franco’s failure to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if 
returned to El Salvador); see also Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (distinguishing 
between decisions subject to the bar, based on the underlying criminal convictions, and 
decisions on the merits, turning on the determination of likelihood of torture). 
16
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issues into two distinct categories: questions of law or questions of fact.
111
  
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact creates a 
critical void into which many determinations in CAT claims fall.
112
 
Applying the standard developed in the Ninth Circuit through the 
decisions in Morales v. Gonzales
113
 and Lemus-Galvan, the jurisdictional 
bar should not be applied to review of denials of deferral under the CAT 
when a denial is not based on underlying criminal convictions because of 
the necessarily mixed question of law and fact at issue.
114
  When a denial of 
deferral is not based on a criminal conviction but instead on a failure to 
meet the burden of proof on one or more elements necessary to warrant 
relief, the determination involves the application of law to facts.
115
  While 
there is no explicit bar to review of mixed questions of law and fact, there 
is also no explicit grant of jurisdiction over review of these questions, 
leaving many issues in jurisdictional “limbo” on appeal.
116
  For example, 
review of CAT claims regularly requires courts to apply a legal standard to 
established facts to determine if the facts meet the standard.
117
  Such a 
                                                          
 111.  See Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) (determining 
which kinds of factual issues are reviewable outside the jurisdictional bar); see also 
Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 264 (7th Cir. 2013) (relying on the finality of a 
decision to determine reviewability); Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (referring to 
denials on the merits of the claim as reviewable, without discussing the need to 
establish reviewability of mixed questions of law and fact). 
 112.  See Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (citing Morales, 478 F.3d 972) 
(constructing a potential exception to the jurisdictional bar for decisions on the merits, 
creating a quasi-mixed question of law and fact grant of jurisdiction); see also 
Sharpless, supra note 34, at 58-59 (arguing the law-fact distinction restricts the ability 
of judicial review to accurately function in denials of CAT claims). 
 113.  478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 114.  See id. at 980-81 (holding determinations made on the merits present mixed 
questions of fact and law on review that are not precluded from review by the 
jurisdictional bar); see also Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (affirming the holding in 
Morales as allowing review of denials of deferral on the merits of the claim, rather than 
due to a criminal conviction). 
 115.  See Morales, 478 F.3d at 980 (differentiating between factual issues and 
denials on the merits, which are not purely legal issues). 
 116.  See Aaron G. Leiderman, Preserving the Constitution’s Most Important 
Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions under the REAL ID Act, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (Oct. 2006) (arguing that circuit courts should treat mixed 
questions of law and fact as questions of law under the REAL ID Act); see also REAL 
ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 331 (2005) (limiting review of CAT 
claims based on jurisdictional limits created by this Act, including restrictions on 
factual and legal issues).  
 117.  See Morales, 478 F.3d at 980 (distinguishing between a determination on the 
merits and a purely legal determination, such as a determination based on the existence 
of a criminal conviction); Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2007) 
17
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determination is not purely legal, like a question of whether a certain 
offense is a crime involving moral turpitude.
118
  Further, the question is not 
a purely factual one, either, like whether an individual filed an application 
during the permissible timeframe.
119
  Based on these examples, it is evident 
that mixed questions tend to look considerably more like legal questions 
and less like purely factual questions.
120
  By ambiguously restricting the 
jurisdiction of appellate courts to review questions that are not pure 
questions of law, the INA as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005 creates 
serious due process concerns for applicants for CAT relief.
121
 
1. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact Do Not Fall Under the 
Jurisdictional Bar Because They Can Be Classified With Questions of Law 
Appellate review of denials of CAT deferral should be treated as mixed 
questions of law and fact, extending appellate jurisdiction to include 
determinations regarding such issues, especially since such jurisdiction is 
not precluded by statute.
122
  The growing view that limiting appellate 
review to questions of law also includes mixed questions opens the door for 
expansion of appellate review to mixed questions in denials of CAT 
deferrals.
123
  In review of fact-based determinations, the difficulty of 
                                                          
(concluding that questions of law in the REAL ID Act of 2005 “includes review of 
application of statutes and regulations to undisputed historical facts”). 
 118.  See Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(denying jurisdiction to review denials of discretionary relief but finding jurisdiction to 
review purely legal questions). 
 119.  See Hernandez-Nolasco v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that likelihood of torture is a purely factual question);.Voskanyan v. Holder, No. 07-
70233, 2011 WL 466818, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2011) (noting whether the respondent 
filed her application within one year of arriving in the United States was a purely 
factual question). 
 120.  See Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(stating that a determination of whether government acquiescence would be likely is 
precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D), but whether the correct legal standard was 
applied is a question of law, and misapplication of the legal standard in light of the 
evidence is reviewable); Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(conceding that whether an individual has a “well-founded fear” is a mixed question of 
fact and law); Jean-Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting 
whether certain conduct would occur is the factual portion and whether that meets a 
legal standard is the legal portion of the mixed question). 
 121.  See U.S. CONST., amend. V. (guaranteeing due process of the law); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (creating exclusive jurisdiction over review of CAT claims, subject 
to limits within the statute). 
 122.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2005) (making petitions for claim under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture).  
 123.  See Adame v. Holder, 777 F.3d 390, 391 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that beyond 
the immigration context, the Supreme Court occasionally interprets mixed questions of 
18
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separating the questions of fact from the questions of law builds a 
compelling basis for the acceptance of the interpretation of statutes as 




The most appropriate way to handle appellate review of denials of CAT 
deferrals is to treat the issue on appeal, if it is not the underlying conviction 
itself, like a mixed question of law and fact in appellate review of criminal 
convictions.
125
 Immigration cases include only limited, conflicting 
discussion of the mixed question of law and fact issue, thus leaving little 
basis for comparison outside of the scope of criminal cases.
126
  Allowing 
appellate review of denials of CAT deferral under the mixed question 
theory is more fair and consistent with the purpose of the CAT and due 
process interests than the current jurisdictional limits of appellate review.
127
  
Treating the issue on appeal as a mixed question permits appellate courts to 
simply identify whether the relevant standard is satisfied by the facts of the 
case.
128
  Under this approach to appellate review, circuit courts would look 
to the facts and law in the case, as adjudged by the immigration judge 
below, taking them as established and beyond dispute.
129
  The scope of the 
appellate inquiry would be whether the rule of law was properly applied to 
the accepted facts in the case.
130
 
Using the treatment of mixed questions in criminal law as a starting 
point for analysis, recent immigration decisions further serve to bolster the 
argument in favor of treating mixed questions of law and fact as questions 
                                                          
law and fact as questions of law).   
 124.  See id. (noting the willingness of some circuits to treat mixed questions of law 
and fact as questions of law for jurisdictional purposes to review immigration claims).   
 125.  See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982) (stating that a 
mixed question of law and fact will permit an appellate court see if the facts of the case 
satisfy some legal standard).   
 126.  See Adame, 777 F.3d at 391 (noting a growing disagreement among the 
circuits regarding how to treat mixed questions of law and fact when addressing the 
scope of appellate jurisdiction). 
 127.  See Heeren, supra note 15, at 1143 (noting that the purpose of CAT is to 
prevent individuals from being removed to countries where they are more likely than 
not to be tortured). 
 128.  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (quoting discussion of 
the treatment of mixed questions of law and fact in Pullman-Standard, identifying the 
facts and rule of law as undisputed on appeal).   
 129.  See id. at 696-97  (limiting appellate review to the application of established 
law to accepted facts). 
 130.  See id. (noting the scope of appellate review of mixed questions of law and 
fact, excluding review of facts or law individually).  
19
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of law under jurisdictional statutes.
131
  The growing number of immigration 
decisions on review that find jurisdiction to review mixed questions of law 
and fact sets a critical foundation for the interpretation of CAT deferral 
claims as reviewable mixed questions.
132
 
2. CAT Deferral Determinations Are Mixed Questions of Law and Fact 
Applying the definition of a mixed question of law and fact from the 
Third Circuit, denials of CAT deferrals based on failure of an applicant to 
bear his or her burden of proof on a particular factor necessary for a grant 
of relief should be reviewable as mixed questions.
133
  Similar forms of 
immigration relief have been accepted as reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D) as mixed questions of law and fact, lending support to 




The Ninth Circuit also provides support for the argument that denials of 
CAT deferral based on failure to meet the burden of proof for factors other 
than the underlying criminal conviction are reviewable as mixed questions 
of law and fact.
135
 
The court’s finding that the question of whether the applicant is more 
likely than not to be tortured and whether such torture will occur with or by 
the acquiescence of public officials is a mixed question of law and fact is 
directly applicable to Ortiz-Franco’s claim to an appeal.
136
  The mixed 
                                                          
 131.  See Adame, 777 F.3d at 391 (citing Supreme Court cases, such as Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, Bogardus v. Commissioner, and Ornelas v. United States, that do 
not treat jurisdictional-stripping language as applying to mixed questions of law and 
fact).   
 132.  See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (identifying 
the reviewability of mixed questions of law and fact, as defined in Pullman-Standard v. 
Swint, in the context of immigration relief); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) (2003) 
(defining the grounds upon which deferral under the CAT will be granted).   
 133.  See Ehikhuemhen v. Att’y Gen., 535 Fed. App’x. 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(defining a mixed question of law and fact as “one that requires application of a legal 
standard to a particular set of circumstances.” (citing Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 
372, 384 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
 134.  See id. (citing Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam), in which the court held that it had jurisdiction to review whether the IJ 
correctly applied law to the accepted facts in a threshold determination in a Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) application)). 
 135.  See Estrada-Corona v. Holder, 554 Fed. App’x. 579, 580 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(finding that whether or not an alien is more likely than not to be tortured with 
acquiescence of government officials is a mixed question of law and fact).  
 136.  See id. (distinguishing between the question of whether facts rise to the 
requisite level of likelihood of torture for relief from a purely factual question of what 
was likely to happen to the applicant if removed to Mexico); see also Ortiz-Franco v. 
20
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question on review before the court in Estrada-Corona was identical to the 
question on appeal before the court in Ortiz-Franco.
137
 
The question on appeal in Ortiz-Franco is distinguishable from other 
questions that are purely factual or purely legal.
138
  Under the standard 
developed by the Ninth Circuit in Ramadan, however, the category of 
mixed questions of law and fact is increasingly broad and encompasses 
many frequently appealed determinations within immigration law.
139
  
Purely legal questions, thus, would involve only reviewing the lower 
court’s interpretation, rather than application, of a particular legal 
standard.
140
  Similarly, a purely factual question strictly involves the 
determination of what specific facts are instead of determining whether 
such facts are sufficient to rise to the level of satisfying a certain legal 
standard.
141
  Thus, mixed questions fill the gap in immigration statutes by 
allowing review of determinations involving only the application of a given 
legal standard to established facts.
142
  Such review more closely resembles 
a legal determination, as it is not functioning to ferret out facts, but instead 
looking to how law is applied to established facts.
143
 
                                                          
Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2015) (raising the question on appeal of likelihood 
Ortiz-Franco would be tortured by gang members with government acquiescence if 
returned to El Salvador). 
 137.  See Ortiz-Franco, 782 F.3d at 85-86 (precluding the question of likelihood of 
torture with government acquiescence from review on appeal due to statutory  bar 
preventing review of factual questions); Estrada-Corona, 554 Fed. App’x. at 579 
(finding likelihood of torture with government acquiescence is a mixed question of law 
and fact). 
 138.  See Ortiz-Franco, 782 F.3d at 85-86 (identifying the question on review as the 
likelihood of torture with government acquiescence if Ortiz-Franco was returned to El 
Salvador); see also Mekonnen v. Holder, 402 Fed. App’x. 316, 317 (mem.) (9th Cir. 
2010) (presenting a purely factual question of timely filing). 
 139.  See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (defining 
mixed questions of law and fact as the application of a legal standard to undisputed 
facts); see also Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(applying the Ramadan definition of mixed question to a due diligence inquiry, holding 
that inquiry is a mixed question of law and fact because it involves the application of a 
legal standard to established facts). 
 140.  See Ghahremani, 498 F.3d at 999 (noting that mixed questions “merely . . . 
apply [a] legal standard,” rather than interpreting the legal standard.).   
 141.  See id. (identifying facts in mixed questions as established and not in dispute).   
 142.  See id. (defining mixed questions of law and fact); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C) (2005) (differentiating between legal and factual questions for the 
purpose of review but failing to address treatment of mixed questions of law and fact). 
 143.  See Ghahremani, 498 F.3d at 999 (differentiating between mixed questions 
and pure questions of law or fact); see also Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 654 (noting the 
omission of the word “pure” from distinctions between questions of law and questions 
of fact in the REAL ID Act of 2005, indicating an allowance of room within the 
21
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Looking beyond the Second Circuit, Lemus-Galvan and Wanjiru also 
provide support for the argument that mixed questions of law and fact 
should not be subject to the jurisdictional bar.
144
  The Ninth Circuit in 
particular created a compelling argument in favor of the treatment of 
denials of deferral based on failure to rise to the requisite level of 
likelihood for one or more of the necessary elements to warrant CAT relief 
as mixed questions of law and fact.
145
  Classifying the type of 
determination the decision was based on as one on the merits is consistent 
with the nature of mixed questions of law and fact, which requires the 
application of a legal standard to established facts.
146
  Essentially, the Ninth 
Circuit was carving out a preservation of appellate jurisdiction for mixed 
questions of law and fact without explicitly calling the type of 
determination up for review a mixed question.
147
 
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the issue of whether the 
jurisdictional bar applies to preclude review of denials of deferral under the 
CAT, but that court held that the bar does not apply for a different reason 
than the Ninth Circuit.
148
  The inapplicability of the bar in Wanjiru turned 
on the lack of finality of a denial of deferral, a determination that is 
completely separate from the analysis of the decision as on the merits in 
Lemus-Galvan.
149
  It is important that these two circuits reached the same 
                                                          
statutory grant of jurisdiction for mixed questions of law and fact). 
 144.  See Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 264 (7th Cir. 2013) (identifying the lack 
of finality as precluding the application of the bar to review of CAT denials); Lemus-
Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) (asserting that the § 
1252(a)(2)(C) bar does not apply to CAT deferral denials because they are necessarily 
made on the merits). 
 145.  See Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (noting that the IJ’s denial was based on 
a finding that Lemus-Galvan did not establish that internal relocation within Mexico 
was not possible). 
 146.  See id. (identifying a “jurisdictional wrinkle” between Lemus-Galvan’s order 
of removal based on his conviction and the subsequent denial of deferral based 
separately on his failure to prove internal relocation would be impossible in Mexico). 
 147.  See id. (distinguishing between decisions based on convictions and those based 
on the merits of a claim). 
 148.  Compare Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (denying applicability of the bar based on a 
lack of sufficient finality in the denial of deferral), with Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 
1084 (holding the nature of the decision as on the merits as the basis for the 
inapplicability of the bar to review of the claim). 
 149.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (identifying deferrals of removal as not final 
because a deferral order is essentially an injunction preventing the enforcement of a 
separate final order of removal); see also Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (reaching 
the same conclusion as Wanjiru, through different means, that the denial was based on 
a determination on the merits of the claim rather than due to an underlying, established 
criminal conviction). 
22
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conclusion in different ways because neither holding precludes the 
application of the other; in fact, the two holdings dovetail with one 
another.
150
  The issue of finality does not preclude a determination that 
deferrals are reviewable because they are mixed questions, necessarily 
decided on the merits.
151
  Likewise, the mixed question argument does not 
prevent the success of the argument that denials are reviewable because 
they are not final orders of removal, but are essentially injunctions.
152
 
Based on the interests of ensuring that individuals’ due process rights are 
protected and that claims are adjudicated consistently, allowing mixed 
questions of law and fact to be reviewed under the same grant of 
jurisdiction as questions of law is the most accurate application of the 
statute.
153
  Circuits are divided over how best to handle mixed questions, 
creating a compelling interest in resolving the question and establishing a 
standard of adjudication that can be applied uniformly.
154
  The nature of 
CAT claims makes treating them as mixed questions that are reviewable 





The INA would deny appropriate and fair review to claims under the 
CAT if the existing appellate review provisions do not incorporate mixed 
questions of law and fact under the grant of jurisdiction for legal 
questions.
156
  Not only would such a failure raise due process concerns, but 
                                                          
 150.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (holding based on a finality); see also Lemus-
Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (focusing on the merits of the claim). 
 151.  See Lemus-Galvan, 518 F.3d at 1084 (finding no language that would preclude 
an alternate finding that the lack of finality of the decision also allows for appellate 
jurisdiction to review the claim). 
 152.  See Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264 (acknowledging the decision in Lemus-Galvan 
and not finding it incompatible with the instant decision). 
 153.  See U.S. CONST., amend. V. (guaranteeing due process of the law); 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(4) (2005) (making petitions for review under the INA the sole means for 
judicial review of any action under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 
limiting the number of claims that are reviewable if mixed questions are not 
reviewable). 
 154.  See Adame v. Holder, 777 F.3d 390, 391 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting a growing 
disagreement among the circuits regarding how to treat mixed questions of law and fact 
when addressing the scope of appellate jurisdiction). 
 155.  See id. at 390 (noting that outside the immigration context, the Supreme Court 
occasionally interprets questions of law as including mixed questions of law and fact) 
(citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982)). 
 156.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2005) (making petitions for review under the INA 
the only means for judicial review of any claim under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture, which would be limited to narrow jurisdiction if the criminal bar 
23
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it would also raise concerns about whether the CAT is being implemented 
in accordance with its purpose or whether certain claims are slipping 
through the statutory cracks.
157
  Further, the overall statutory purpose and 
construction indicates intent by legislators to allow review of CAT 
denials.
158
  Even if an argument in favor of allowing review of mixed 
questions as subsumed under the grant of jurisdiction over questions of law 
is not compelling, courts have sufficient basis to note jurisdiction based on 
statutory construction and purpose.
159
  This Comment is only limited to the 
narrow discussion of the jurisdiction to review mixed questions of fact and 
law within the scope of denials of deferral of removal under the CAT, and 
it does not foreclose any future arguments regarding other provisions of the 




                                                          
applied). 
 157.  See U.S. CONST., amend. V. (guaranteeing due process of the law); see Adame, 
777 F.3d at 391 (citing a growing disagreement regarding how to treat mixed questions 
of law and fact). 
 158.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)-(5) (creating a distinction between order of removal 
and CAT claims); Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 89 (2nd Cir. 2015) (finding that 
§ 1252(a)(4) clarifies rather than being a redundancy); see also Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 32, at 21 (identifying the contradiction in the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the tension between § 1252(a)(4) and (5)). 
 159.  See Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(distinguishing between pure questions of law or fact and mixed questions of law and 
fact); Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the omission of 
the word pure in the REAL ID Act of 2005 in regards to distinctions between types of 
questions for jurisdictional purposes). 
 160.  See supra Part II-III (discussing the nature of mixed questions and how they fit 
within the appellate jurisdiction of reviewable questions). 
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